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As soon as the Egyptian uprising of January 2011 grew into an 
avalanche threatening to tear down the major ramparts of Husni 
Mubarak’s regime, analysts rushed to witness these events and 
render judgment on their causes and consequences.   Western 
analysts in particular declared unhesitatingly that domestic 
factors alone were to blame and that the dismantling of the 
corrupt liberal regime was unrelated to popular disapproval of 
Egypt’s role in the Palestinian – Israeli conflict.  Among these 
was New York Times’ columnist Thomas L. Friedman who 
offered his astonishment at the intense popular passion and 
determination displayed at Cairo’s Tahrir Square and at the 
visible absence of the Muslim Brotherhood from the epicenter 
of the avalanche.  He also noted the non-presence of the word 
‘Israel’ or representations of Egyptian ‘martyrs’ who died fighting 
the enemy to the north and east of the country. (1) A few months 
later, Friedman was proven wrong on both counts.
     As much as divorcing the Egyptian uprising from the 
Palestinian – Israeli conflict was tempting to the main-stream 
American media; it soon became self-evident that Egyptians 
never forgot their country’s existential involvement in the 
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Middle East’s main regional fissure separating 
the state of israel from the rest of the Arab 
world.  The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood 
to Egypt’s top leadership rung finally injected 
some realism in the calculations of Western 
observers who suddenly began to dredge 
up the Brotherhood’s history in gaza and its 
continued multi-faceted connection to the 
Hamas government.  This paper argues that 
predicting an inevitable clash with israel also 
flies in the face of sound political analysis since 
the Brotherhood has already demonstrated that 
it is as much a prisoner of geopolitical realities 
as most of the previous regimes.  geopolitical 
considerations, therefore, will have to be 
balanced against an expected tilt towards 
greater realism once the Brotherhood’s role 
was transformed from that of an oppositional 
political group to a ruling clique charged with 
protecting Egypt’s interests.
     geography has linked Egypt’s fate to 
that of Sinai and gaza ever since the ottoman 
state signed an agreement with the British 
protectorate government of Egypt in 1906, 
demarcating the ottoman border in palestine 
north of Sinai, thereby ceding the latter to 
Egypt.(2) The creation of a non-Arab Zionist 
state in palestine in 1948 inevitably led to 
Egypt’s participation in the first Arab-Jewish 
War, leading it to assume administrative 
duties over gaza.  Several Egyptian-israeli 
wars followed, interspersed by cross raids 
from and into gaza, until the signing of the 
Camp David Treaty of 1979.  The palestinian 
population of gaza, as well as the Bedouin 
tribes of Sinai, continued to be rebellious, 
producing a permanent state of instability 
along the Egyptian-israeli frontier even during 
the post-treaty years.
nasserite and Zionist Geopolitical 
As much as divorcing the Egyptian uprising 
from the Palestinian – Israeli conflict was 
tempting to the main-stream American 
media; it soon became self-evident that 
Egyptians never forgot their country’s 
existential involvement in the Middle 
East’s main regional fissure separating the 
state of Israel from the rest of the Arab 
world.
The creation of a non-Arab Zionist state in 
Palestine in 1948 inevitably led to Egypt’s 
participation in the first Arab-Jewish War, 
leading it to assume administrative duties 
over Gaza.  
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Confrontations
Although most 
studies stress the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s 
commitment to the 
Arab cause, few have 
cared to reflect on the 
nasserite basis of the 
policy of pan-Arabism. 
Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood’s founder, 
often emphasized that Arabs were islam’s 
first adherents, espousing the principle of 
Arab unity not only to defy advocates of 
Egypt’s pharaonic identity during the 1920’s 
and 1930’s, but also as a first step towards 
islamic unity.  palestine became the object of 
his rhetoric against Zionist settlers due to its 
Arab and Muslim identity.  The configuration 
of Egypt’s ideological scene prior to 1948, 
furthermore, led to the Brotherhood’s 
adoption of the palestinian cause.  Since 
most of the political parties during Egypt’s 
monarchic period such as the Wafd and the 
Liberal Constitutionalists advocated a narrow 
and secular brand of Egyptian nationalism, 
the Muslim Brotherhood fortified its appeal 
through the adoption of a wider Arab and 
islamic nationalism.(3)
     Although 
it was commonly 
assumed that the 
Nasserite refinement 
of the concept of pan-
Arabism, elucidated 
in his book Egypt’s 
Liberation (public 
Affairs press, 1955), 
was simply an effort to firm up Egypt’s cultural 
and economic advantage within the recently-
independent Arab states, a closer look at his 
early military career reveals other motivations 
for his entanglement with israel.   nasser, 
who had studied strategy at the War College, 
viewed israel’s extension of its southern 
boundaries into the negev Desert in october 
1948 with great alarm.  He bristled at this 
expansion since it was undertaken in defiance 
of the Un Security Council resolution S/1070 
of 4 november1948 and was accompanied 
by the forced removal of the area’s Bedouins 
to Jordan and Egypt.  He viewed this as a 
deliberate attempt to disrupt ancient land 
routes which connected Egypt to the rest of 
the Arab world.  Being more appreciative of the 
geopolitical value of a neutral or a pro-Egyptian 
land-bridge east of Suez than other Egyptian 
leaders, nasser explained his understanding 
Since most of the political parties during 
Egypt’s monarchic period such as the Wafd 
and the Liberal Constitutionalists advocated 
a narrow and secular brand of Egyptian 
nationalism, the Muslim Brotherhood 
fortified its appeal through the adoption of a 
wider Arab and Islamic nationalism.
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of the geopolitical significance of Sinai and 
gaza to Egypt’s defenses in an interview with 
British journalist Desmond Stewart.(4) nasser’s 
awareness of the vulnerability of southern 
palestine which borders on his country to 
sudden Israeli attacks was confirmed by the 
latter’s 1955 raid on gaza.(5) Having failed to 
gain for Egypt a reasonable strategic depth in 
Sinai and gaza, nasser shifted his sights to 
unity with Syria in order to encircle the Zionist 
state.  Then involvement with yemen in the 
1960s led to a protracted war joined by Saudi 
Arabia on the side of the royalist regime, a 
quagmire which ended only after the 1967 
June war.  The short lived Egyptian-Syrian 
union (The United Arab republic, 1958-
1961) which also failed, was a lesson which 
president Anwar Sadat absorbed well, leading 
him to achieve a different, and looser, strategic 
depth by briefly uniting with Syria, Libya, and 
the Sudan.(6)
     yet, nasser while he lived, continued 
to feel vulnerable in the north when israel 
targeted gaza in the wake of the 1967 June 
War by, singling it out for its usual effort to expel 
the area’s palestinian refugees as was done 
to the Bedouins in 1948.  Evicting palestinian 
refugees from gaza’s camps was the logical 
outcome of israel’s strategic thinking which 
always planned to fortify its southern defenses 
by seizing gaza, but without its dense 
impoverished population.  prime Minister 
David Ben gurion was always obsessed with 
the threat posed by the presence of 200,000 
refugees in the gaza Strip alone.  yigal 
Allon, israeli arch-defender of the policy of 
conventional, rather than nuclear, deterrence, 
suggested during a cabinet meeting that 
a large number of palestinian refugees be 
pushed across the Suez Canal into Egypt. 
Another official, David Horowitz, head of the 
Bank of israel, resurrected the old Zionist 
tactic of trying to buy what appeared to be hard 
to acquire by any other means by suggesting 
purchasing the Sinai peninsula from Egypt.(7) 
Even though other territorialist politicians such 
as  Menachem Begin and Allon objected to 
settling gaza’s refugees in the West Bank and 
the Jordan Valley which they wished to reserve 
for future Jewish settlements, the government 
of Levi Eshkol persisted in planning for a gaza 
Having failed to gain for Egypt a 
reasonable strategic depth in Sinai and 
Gaza, Nasser shifted his sights to unity 
with Syria in order to encircle the Zionist 
state.
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evacuation.   A special office attached to that of 
the prime minister and headed by Ada Sereni, 
a prominent italian Zionis was devoted to this 
plan.  She argued that gaza’s refugees could 
be relocated to Jordan within two years upon 
paying each family a modest compensation. 
But Eshkol rejected the idea of financing the 
operation, while the palestinians proved too 
un-cooperative with the military governor’s 
scheme.  resistance by the residents’ of the 
gaza Strip’s largest refugee camp, Jabalya, 
was harshly suppressed.(8)
     Thus, Egypt always viewed gaza and 
Sinai through a defense prism, based on its 
understanding of the impact of geography on 
its own political choices, particularly after con-
fronting israel’s expansionist intentions head-
on.  israel, on the other hand, maintained a 
constant definition of its security needs in the 
southern parts of its territory.  israel’s foreign 
policy approach to these geopolitical realities, 
which settled on an expansionist option, 
according to political theorist philippe Moreau 
Defarges, grew out of its promised Land theory 
which clashed with the country’s borderland 
realities.  The Cold War period proved greatly 
suited to israel’s determination to achieve the 
boundaries of its Biblical past by aligning itself 
with one of the two superpowers of that point 
in time, namely the United States.(9)
Demographic Restrains in Post-1967 
Gaza
israel’s faith in its military invincibility 
following its unexpected victory of 1967, did 
not end Egypt’s connections to gaza.  But 
as a result of its fateful decision to hold on to 
its new land acquisitions, israel found itself 
confronted with the demographic realities of 
that area.  More than any other part of historic 
palestine, the gaza Strip became home to the 
largest concentration of refugees from other 
parts of the country after the war of 1948.  The 
gaza District, which is among the largest of 
Evicting Palestinian refugees from Gaza’s 
camps was the logical outcome of Israel’s 
strategic thinking which always planned 
to fortify its southern defenses by seizing 
Gaza, but without its dense impoverished 
population.  
Having failed to gain for Egypt a reasonable 
strategic depth in Sinai and Gaza, Nasser 
shifted his sights to unity with Syria in order to 
encircle the Zionist state.  
KUFA REVIEW: Academic Journal
52 KUFA REVIEW: No.2 - Issue 3 - Fall 2013
the five districts in the Gaza Strip, became 
home to al-Shatii refugee camp.  The northern 
District became the location of the sprawling 
Jabalya camp, and the District of Deir al-Balah 
housed four other camps, while the Districts of 
Khan younis and rafah in the south housed 
two more camps.  All of the eight camps within 
the Strip date back to 19481949-.  Thus, the 
gaza Strip which is 45 kilometers long and 
612- kilometers wide, measuring five per cent 
of the total area of palestine became home 
to 1.5 million people who lived mostly on 
Un dole.(10) Most of Jabalya’s residents, for 
instance, came originally from Jaffa, Lyddah, 
and Ashdod.  residents of this large camp still 
refer their medical emergencies to hospitals in 
gaza City.(11)
The  congested  and  impoverished 
conditions of the camps, as well as the harsh 
treatment of the israeli military authorities, 
hastened the process of radicalizing the 
refugees.(12) it was 
no accident that the 
spark which lit the 
first intifada’s fuse 
in 1987 originated 
in gaza, leading to 
the intensification of 
Israel’s iron fist policy.  For a while, allegiance 
to Fateh, the palestinian liberation group which 
emerged under yasser Arafat’s leadership in 
the late 1960s, began to compete with another 
grassroots formation which adopted an islamist 
ideology of resistance, namely Hamas.  Even 
though gaza produced the earliest cadre of 
Fateh’s secular leadership, such as Khalil 
al-Wazir (aka Abu-Jihad) and Salah Khalaf 
(aka Abu Iyad), Islamic ideological influences 
continued to seep in from Egypt and to take 
root in the palestinian territory. gazans 
who studied at al-Azhar islamic university 
in Cairo and those who were attracted to 
oppositional movements gravitated towards 
the well-established underground network of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  By the 1960s and 
1970s, the Brotherhood had acquired an 
extensive organizational experience and a 
well-defined ideology of re-Islamization of the 
global Muslim community.  Hamas came into 
being when it released its first communique on 
14 December 1987, 
as a participant in the 
national leadership 
of the first intifada. 
Having monopolized 
local educational and 
religious institutions, 
Evicting Palestinian refugees from Gaza’s 
camps was the logical outcome of Israel’s 
strategic thinking which always planned 
to fortify its southern defenses by seizing 
Gaza, but without its dense impoverished 
population.  
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Hamas also emerged as a leader in the 
social-welfare field which assured it of a huge 
following.(13)
     Hamas was never a propagator of al-
Qaida’s philosophy, known as ‘Madrasat al-
fikr al-salafi al-jihadi’ (The School of Jihadi 
Salafi Thought).  Instead, Hamas had always 
adhered to the ideology of the Brotherhood’s 
moderate wing which advocated a gradualist 
approach to the creation of an islamic society 
in palestine, and not necessarily the global, 
supra-islamic state.  in addition to emphasizing 
palestine’s distinct status as a sacred territory 
associated with Muhammad’s ascent to 
heaven on his nocturnal journey to Jerusalem 
(al-israa wa al-miiraj), Hamas stated in part 1 
of Article 11 of its Charter that ‘no Arab nor 
the aggregate of all Arab countries, and no 
Arab king or president nor all of them in the 
aggregate, have that right’ to give palestine 
away.(14) 
palestine is considered a waqf (islamic 
trust), the ownership of which cannot be 
alienated through deals as Article 13 indicates. 
it can only be liberated through the sacred 
struggle, or jihad.  Additionally, Hamas never 
attempted to extend its liberation battle to 
areas other than the palestinian arena.  nor 
did it engage in targeting foreign nationals 
as a means of avenging Muslim victims of 
Western aggression. These distinctions from 
other pan-islamic movements have further 
differentiated Hamas from both the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood and Fateh’s rule in the 
pnA’s areas.  nevertheless, it should be easy 
to discern a clear similarity between Hamas 
and the Brotherhood in that both developed 
a specific nationalist-Islamic ideology, suited 
for each specific territory.  As to Fateh and 
the pnA, its successor government, Hamas 
moved away from them since they renounced 
violence culminating in the recognition of 
israel in the oslo Accords of 1993, sans any 
legally-binding concessions on israel’s part. 
Egypt always viewed Gaza and Sinai 
through a defense prism, based on its 
understanding of the impact of geography 
on its own political choices, particularly after 
confronting Israel’s expansionist intentions 
head-on.
More than any other part of historic 
Palestine, the Gaza Strip became home to 
the largest concentration of refugees from 
other parts of the country after the war of 
1948.
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Hamas remained critical of the pLo’s failure 
to obligate israel to end its occupation of 
palestinian lands.  When the pLo, therefore, 
surrendered its commitment to the principle 
of the armed struggle, Hamas continued to 
define the national liberation battle through the 
prism of its islamic world view.  Hamas won 
the majority of seats in the second legislative 
council elections of 2006, only to suffer a 
final rupture with the PNA which attempted 
an American-backed coup resulting in its 
total expulsion from the gaza Strip.(15) now, 
ideology fortified Gaza’s geopolitical centrality 
to Egypt’s defenses even before the rise of 
a Muslim Brotherhood government in 2012. 
Defeating the pnA has been a pyric victory 
for Hamas, which, by exiling of the pnA to the 
West Bank, created a new dependence on 
Egypt.  israel responded with the imprisonment 
of most of Hamas’ elected parliamentarians 
and embarked on a successful assassination 
campaign targeting the gaza leadership. This 
turned out to be israel’s opportunity to shift 
gaza’s burden from the West Bank to Egypt, 
as the latter became under Mubarak a willing 
partner in the segmentation of the palestinian 
leadership.(16)
The Camp David agreement and the 
neutralization of sinai  
Just as israel’s acquisition of the gaza 
Strip in 1967 failed to end the country’s 
southern vulnerability, the neutralization of 
gaza following the Camp David Treaty of 
1978 remained tangled in the israeli siege 
over gaza.  The single decade separating 
the June War of 1967 and the 1973 october 
War saw israel gain an opportunity to sign a 
peace treaty with a major Arab state for the 
first time in the region’s history.  Israel’s Prime 
Minister, Menachem Begin, though previously 
a hawkish and expansionist leader, resolved 
to cede Sinai back to Egyptian sovereignty for 
reasons unrelated to the area’s geopolitical 
Having monopolized local educational and 
religious institutions, Hamas also emerged 
as a leader in the social-welfare field which 
assured it of a huge following.
Hamas never attempted to extend its 
liberation battle to areas other than the 
Palestinian arena.  Nor did it engage in 
targeting foreign nationals as a means 
of avenging Muslim victims of Western 
aggression. 
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value.(17) Egypt, which accepted the return of 
a demilitarized Sinai, unknowingly aided in the 
realization of a cherished israeli strategic goal. 
By barring the passage of Egyptian troops 
through this land bridge, israel, in effect, was 
denying the Arab world’s largest land army the 
right to participate in future Arab-israeli wars. 
The neutralization was, thus, complete which 
assured israel’s future security in Sinai and 
the rest of the Arab region.  Begin, however, 
harbored another incentive, namely blocking 
any movement towards the creation of an 
independent palestinian state in the West 
Bank and gaza.  By acceding to the symbolic 
restoration of Sinai to Egyptian control, 
Begin appeared to be willing to strengthen 
the Sadat government’s claim of restoring 
Egyptian territory by diplomatic, rather than 
military, means. This attitude was based on 
a clear understanding of Sadat’s prioritization 
of Sinai over the West Bank or gaza, even 
though granting the palestinians their state 
would have greatly facilitated general Arab 
acceptance of the peace treaty.(18)
     Additionally, Israel was not satisfied 
with Egypt’s treaty guarantees against any 
further use of Sinai as a launching ground for 
hostile military operations.  The Camp David 
Treaty was not only brokered by an American 
president, Jimmy Carter, it was followed by 
an American memorandum of understanding 
(AMU) with israel which spelled out clearly the 
obligations of the former in case of breaching 
the treaty’s clauses.  THE AMU read as 
follows:
1.  in the light of the role of the United 
States in achieving the Treaty of peace 
and the parties’ desire that the United 
States continue its supportive efforts, 
the United States will take appropriate 
measures to promote full observance of 
the Treaty of peace.
2.  Should it be demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of the United States that 
there has been a violation . . . of the 
Treaty of peace, the United States 
will take such remedial measures as it 
deems appropriate, which may include 
diplomatic, economic, and military 
measures as described below.
Just as Israel’s acquisition of the Gaza 
Strip in 1967 failed to end the country’s 
southern vulnerability, the neutralization 
of Gaza following the Camp David Treaty of 
1978 remained tangled in the Israeli siege 
over Gaza.  
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3. . . . in particular, if a violation of the 
Treaty of peace is deemed to threaten 
the security of israel . . . or an armed 
attack against israel, the United States 
will be prepared to consider, on an 
urgent basis, such measures as the 
strengthening of the United States 
presence in the area, the providing of 
emergency supplies to israel, and the 
exercise of maritime rights in order to 
put an end to the violation . . .
4.  The United States will oppose, if 
necessary, vote against any action or 
resolution in the United nations which 
in its judgment adversely affects the 
Treaty of peace.(19)
This memo was followed by another one 
specifically dedicated to Israel’s oil needs, in 
which the co-signers, israeli Defense Minister 
Moshe Dayan and United States Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance, agreed to extend the 1975 
oil agreement between the two by another 
ten years.  in view of Egypt’s repossession 
of its oil fields at Abu Rudeis in the Sinai, the 
United States committed itself to undertake 
new arrangements for supplying oil to israel.
(20) Egypt, which gained back some land, was 
not given United States assurances in case 
of an israeli breach of the treaty.  But the 
agreement, nevertheless, provided israel’s 
ruling Likud party with a rare opportunity and 
renewed self-assurance in its ability to defeat 
its Arab enemies, prompting it to strike iraq’s 
nuclear reactor.  israel also formally annexed 
the Syrian golan Heights, invaded Lebanon in 
pursuit of pLo guerrillas, and rapidly increased 
the tempo of settlement building in the West 
Bank and gaza.  Thus, Begin’s ideological 
predisposition favoring the fulfillment of Biblical 
promise of greater israel won over the Labor 
party’s advocacy of land for peace approach 
due to the absence of Egyptian military force 
from the Arab region.(21)
Even while president Sadat remained 
By barring the passage of Egyptian troops 
through this land bridge, Israel, in effect, 
was denying the Arab world’s largest land 
army the right to participate in future 
Arab-Israeli wars.  
In view of Egypt’s repossession of its 
oil fields at Abu Rudeis in the Sinai, 
the United States committed itself 
to undertake new arrangements for 
supplying oil to Israel.
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in power during the remaining two years 
before his assassination, the Egyptian public 
developed a cold and rejectionist attitude 
towards the peace treaty.  Boycotting israel 
culturally and economically became a 
general Egyptian article of faith.  Much of this 
deliberate campaign which was led by Egypt’s 
intellectuals, journalists, and opinion-makers 
was a result of   suspicion that the Egyptian 
government was secretly dealing with israel. 
There was also public anger at other policies 
such as bearing down harshly on gaza’s 
national resistance activity lest it disturb 
the Egyptian-israeli peace.  For instance, it 
was not until 2009 that the Egyptian media 
uncovered Egypt’s secret natural gas trade 
agreement with israel which provided the 
latter with gas at reduced prices.  providing 
israel with one of Egypt’s valuable resources 
was bad enough, but then the Egyptians 
discovered other concessions to the enemy 
state.  During the same year, they learnt of 
the passage of a german-made dolphin-class 
submarine through the Suez Canal.  Although 
the treaty assured israel of safe passage for 
its ships through the Canal and the Straits of 
Tiran, a submarine was considered a military 
vessel.  Egyptian fury increased when rumors 
circulated that this was a nuclear submarine 
making its way through such dangerous 
waters simply to drive a message to iran that 
israel possessed various means of threatening 
its nuclear capability. By that time, Egypt 
was beginning to coordinate its moves with 
israel against iran, while the Egyptian public 
remained fixated on the Israeli threat to its 
borders and to gaza.(22)
Another development growing out of the 
pacification and neutralization of the Sinai 
front was the transformation of Egypt’s 
military from an active force to a business 
conglomerate.  By 2011, Egyptian military 
industries and business ventures were 
several percentage points of the country’s 
gross domestic product (gDp).  Taking 
advantage of a 1956 ban on reporting on the 
military in the Egyptian media, the military’s 
industrial and business empire grew under 
Even while President Sadat remained 
in power during the remaining two 
years before his assassination, the 
Egyptian public developed a cold and 
rejectionist attitude towards the peace 
treaty.  Boycotting Israel culturally and 
economically became a general Egyptian 
article of faith.  
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the auspices of the national Service projects 
organization (nSpo) and similar groups 
directed by the ministry of defense.  neither 
was the military’s annual budget known to the 
public.  The whole enterprise was overseen 
by holding companies such as the nSpo, 
the organization for Arab industrialization, 
and al-nasr Company. All of these industries 
came into being after the Camp David Treaty 
demobilized military industries, forcing them 
to turn into civilian plants.  At the same time, 
the Egyptian Defense Ministry exited Sinai 
but continued to control large swaths of land 
along the eastern shore of the red Sea which 
were eventually sold in the 1980s and 1990s 
to pro-government groups.  These lands were 
developed as resorts such as Sharm al-Sheikh 
on the southern end of the gulf of Aqaba, 
which expanded the Egyptian tourism trade for 
the benefit of members of the ruling National 
Democratic party.  Cables of the American 
State Department released by WikiLeaks in 
2008 revealed how these vast landholdings 
were the price of keeping the Egyptian military 
content their post-Camp David dormancy. 
Apparently, the military were not allowed a 
presence in the highest rungs of the Egyptian 
economy such as telecommunications and 
oil but were confined to a special economic 
niche.  Until Egypt’s revolution of 2011, the 
officer class stayed out of politics entirely but 
were credited with maintaining stability along 
the country’s borders.(23)
United states Foreign aid and the 
entrenchment of the Camp David 
Treaty
nothing explains the acquiescence of the 
Mubarak regime and the military establishment 
in Egypt’s pacification and withdrawal from 
Arab politics more than the manner in which 
foreign aid was dispensed and utilized. 
Whereas Egyptians of all political persuasions 
were aware of United States massive military 
Another development growing out of the 
pacification and neutralization of the Sinai 
front was the transformation of Egypt’s 
military from an active force to a business 
conglomerate.  
The Brotherhood was the leading 
critic of the strategic and economic 
consequences of the Camp David peace, 
making Mubarak’s Palestinian policies the 
epicenter of its comprehensive opposition 
to the regime.
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assistance to the israeli state, few expected 
that the former’s aid to Egypt would be kept 
deliberately unmilitary in nature.  For instance, 
by September 1978, the United States had 
affirmed its earlier promise to Israel to finance 
the building of two airbases in the negev as a 
replacement for the evacuation of the airfields 
of Eitan and Etzion from Sinai. The Brotherhood 
was the leading critic of the strategic and 
economic consequences of the Camp David 
peace, making Mubarak’s palestinian policies 
the epicenter of its comprehensive opposition 
to the regime.(24)
     United States aid to Egypt during the 
1980s and 1990s also had unanticipated 
consequences.  Although Egypt received 
$28 billion in development aid under 
Sadat, the volume of American assistance 
rose to $50 billion after the Camp David 
Treaty.  in the opinion of American analysts, 
foreign assistance, whether earmarked for 
development or military expenditure, would 
inevitably strengthen the internal dominance 
and power of undemocratic regimes.  Larry 
Diamond, thus, wrote:
External support for Arab regimes . . . 
confers on Arab autocracies crucial economic 
resources, security assistance, and political 
legitimacy.  in these circumstances, for non-oil 
regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, 
foreign aid is like oil: another source of rents 
that regimes use for survival.
Like oil, aid flows into the central coffers of 
the state and helps give it the means both to 
co-opt and repress.(25)
      Satiating the Egyptian economy with 
United States aid produced similar outcomes 
predicted also by two economists, giacomo 
Luciani and Hazem Beblawi in their landmark 
study, The Rentier State: Nation, State and 
Integration in the Arab World (Croom Helm, 
1987).  But not only did the United States 
increase its aid program to Egypt as a reward 
for its commitment to the treaty with israel, the 
United States also devised a scheme making 
the Egyptian military the most dependent 
sector on its largesse.  Egypt has been 
receiving $1.3 billion a year in military aid 
since 1987, while israel received a boost in 
not only did the United States increase 
its aid program to Egypt as a reward for 
its commitment to the treaty with Israel, 
the United States also devised a scheme 
making the Egyptian military the most 
dependent sector on its largesse.  
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the amount of aid it receives from the United 
States, bringing it to $3 billion by fiscal year 
2018.  This was the result of the signing of 
a Memo of Understanding (MoU) in 2007 by 
president george W. Bush, while the level 
of aid to Egypt remained the same.  The 
centerpiece of the military aid to Egypt was a 
joint US-Egyptian program for the production of 
the M1A1 Abrams field tank which has netted 
1,200 tanks for Egypt since 1988.  Some of 
the tank’s parts were produced at a facility 
outside of Cairo, while the rest were made 
by general Dynamics in Sterling Heights, 
Michigan.  Egypt was also the recipient of 
Excess Defense Articles, valued at millions 
of dollars from the United States Defense 
Department.  Until recently, the latter was 
constantly trying to persuade Egypt to focus 
its military procurement on counter-terrorism 
and counter-insurgency material in order to 
deal with its security problems in Sinai.(26) 
     By Fy2013, United States aid to Egypt 
was divided on the basis of an allotment of 
$1.3 billion in military assistance and only 
$250 million in economic aid. By continuing its 
aid to Egypt, both military and economic, the 
United States hoped to achieve three goals 
which have defined the Egyptian-American 
and, by extension, the Egyptian-israeli, 
relationship since the signing of the Camp 
David Treaty.  According to a recent study 
by the Congressional research Service, by 
assuring freedom of navigation and peaceful 
conditions along the Suez Canal route, the 
treaty also assured the United States navy of 
smooth passage for its warships travelling to 
the waters of the persian gulf region.  if the 
Canal was blocked, as occasionally happened 
during the nasserite period, United States 
ships would be forced to use the much-longer 
route from norfolk, Virginia to the red Sea by 
rounding the Cape of good Hope.  Secondly, 
United States aid simply assured maintaining 
the treaty since any threat to this alliance 
jeopardized the flow of equipment and arms 
by assuring freedom of navigation and 
peaceful conditions along the Suez Canal 
route, the treaty also assured the United 
States Navy of smooth passage for its 
warships travelling to the waters of the 
Persian Gulf region.  
by boosting the domestic economy 
of Egypt, the United States hoped to 
reduce social discontent and strengthen 
democratic tendencies in the Arab world’s 
largest country.
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to the Egyptian military, thereby diminishing 
its domestic status and rendering it vulnerable 
to israeli attacks.  Thirdly, by boosting the 
domestic economy of Egypt, the United 
States hoped to reduce social discontent and 
strengthen democratic tendencies in the Arab 
world’s largest country.
      in reality, the steady infusion of civilian 
and military aid facilitated the isolation of the 
military from public life while at the same 
time providing the state with the means to 
resist public demands for a better economic 
performance. For instance, the Egyptian public 
never knew the extent of Egyptian and israeli 
military and intelligence coordination, but 
in the absence of any published information 
on military matters, it always suspected the 
worse.  This cooperation which always aimed 
at containing palestinian unrest in gaza and 
maintaining the security 
of Sinai against restive 
Bedouin elements 
also committed the 
Egyptians to play a 
large role in settling the 
Fateh-Hamas dispute 
later on.(27)
     in the past, no 
group was as critical of Egypt’s loss of leverage 
over security issues in gaza and Sinai than 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  yet, clearly the 
Brotherhood was not the only formation 
opposed to this facet of Egypt’s Arab policies. 
A broad islamist spectrum dating back to the 
1970s consisting of such groups as al-Azhar, 
independent islamist preachers and sheikhs, 
university students and Jihadist underground 
cells coalesced around the Brotherhood in its 
defiance of Egypt’s secularist regime. Although 
they looked approvingly at first at Sadat’s 
peace initiative towards israel, such groups as 
al-Azhar and a core islamist nucleus within the 
national Democratic party later became more 
critical without breaking ranks with Sadat’s 
government.  Thus, a moderate islamist 
group could be distinguished from extreme 
islamists while Sadat lived.  As expected, al-
Azhar’s head, Dr. Abd 
al-Halim Mahmoud, a 
government appointee, 
at first supported Sadat’s 
visit to Jerusalem in 
1977 on the pages of 
al-Ahram daily. He also 
declared that the Camp 
David Treaty was a 
victory for islam since it 
As expected, al-Azhar’s head, Dr. Abd 
al-Halim Mahmoud, a government 
appointee, at first supported Sadat’s visit 
to Jerusalem in 1977 on the pages of 
al-Ahram daily. He also declared that the 
Camp David Treaty was a victory for Islam 
since it will end all wars and bring the 
nation to a state of peace in accordance 
with God’s teachings.
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will end all wars and bring the nation to a state 
of peace in accordance with god’s teachings.
(28)
     The Muslim Brotherhood, however, took 
it upon itself to criticize the treaty and al-Azhar 
directly in all of its official and underground 
publications.  Calling on members of the 
official Islamic establishment to defect and 
join its campaign, the Brotherhood engaged in 
an inter-Islamist struggle which prefigured the 
later effort in 2022 to gain adherents within al-
Azhar.  The Brotherhood used the pages of 
its official journal al-Daawa (The Call) to reject 
the Egyptian call to an Arab-israeli peace 
conference to be held at geneva in 1976, 
arguing that any peace effort will not triumph 
given israel’s refusal to end its occupation 
of gaza and the West Bank.  When Sadat 
paid his historic visit to Jerusalem, al-Daawa 
expressed fear that peace with israel will be 
used to pressure all Arab state to end their 
economic and political isolation of israel.  The 
paper added that United States, the sponsor 
of this peace, would never adopt policies 
inimical to israel’s interests. The paper also 
kept its readers appraised of Jewish attempts 
to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 
order to replace it with a replica of the ancient 
Jewish Temple. The expansion of Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank even while 
the treaty was being negotiated was also 
highlighted.  These editorials, which appeared 
between 1976 and 1977, carried such titles 
as: “The Dispute between the Americans 
and the Jews was a Hoax,” “The issue of Al-
Aqsa Mosque Becomes More Dangerous,” 
and “Begin is israel’s Unadorned Face.”  A 
piece analyzing Sadat’s foreign policy was 
headlined, “palestine is an islamic Cause,” 
emphasizing one of the Brotherhood’s core 
beliefs.(29)
     Al-Daawa was vehement about the 
dangerous outcome of the treaty, declaring that 
once   signed Israel will be the main beneficiary 
of the peace.  The paper emphasized 
first and foremost the inevitable economic 
consequences of this treaty, economic gain 
being the primary israeli objective here.  As 
soon as Egypt opened its borders to israeli 
goods, israel would penetrate all Arab markets. 
As soon as Egypt opened its borders to 
Israeli goods, Israel would penetrate all 
Arab markets.  Israel would, thus, improve 
its own industrial opportunities and 
provide greater employment to its own 
citizens at the Arabs’ expense
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israel would, thus, improve its own industrial 
opportunities and provide greater employment 
to its own citizens at the Arabs’ expense. 
israel would eventually dominate the Egyptian 
market since the latter was the weaker of the 
two.  The paper also quoted an israeli cabinet 
minister as saying that his country hoped to 
supplant Beirut one day as the most important 
financial center in the Middle East.  Finally, 
the paper hammered at the uncertain future of 
the West Bank and gaza once Jordan refused 
to join the Camp David negotiations.  neither 
did the treaty guarantee the security of Sinai 
since the Egyptian military presence in this 
region was confined to an area 50 kilometers 
in length, running from the Suez Canal to the 
gulf of Suez. Even here, Egyptian troops 
were restricted to a lightly-armored military 
company.  The rest of Sinai, comprising an 
area sixty-one thousand square kilometers, 
was left demilitarized and under the control of 
international troops.  Al-Daawa then pointed 
out that the treaty limited the right to request 
removal of these troops to the five members of 
the Security Council, and not to Egypt.(30)
egyptian- israeli Relations under 
mubarak
The Muslim Brotherhood remained at 
the head of Egypt’s oppositional movement 
throughout the years of Husni Mubarak’s 
regime, 19812011-.  Though poised to take 
advantage of any political opening that will 
jettison it to power, the Brotherhood disclaimed 
any exclusive role in starting the uprising 
of 2011.  one of the movement’s articulate 
defenders, Fahmy Huweidy, objected 
vehemently to the Mubarak government’s 
accusations that the Brotherhood alone 
fomented and led the riots which launched 
the uprising.  What really rankled Howeidy, 
however, was the regime’s description of the 
Brotherhood as a group ‘with special agendas.’ 
The Brotherhood, he stressed, was simply 
following the lead of the angry masses who 
demanded an end Mubarak’s tenure in office. 
All of these national forces, he wrote, had 
The Muslim Brotherhood remained at the 
head of Egypt’s oppositional movement 
throughout the years of Husni Mubarak’s 
regime, 1981-2011
Israel’s harsh repression of the 
Palestinians, particularly in the Gaza Strip, 
delegitimized Egypt and the peace treaty.  
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suffered from the monopolization of power by 
a corrupt elite, being subjected to emergency 
regulations, restricted public freedoms, the 
squandering national wealth and resources, 
police brutality, and extreme poverty.  All of 
these demeaned people and broke their back. 
But then he went on to enumerate what Egypt 
suffered from externally, claiming that the 
country had been humiliated by its reduction of 
stature and its annexation to American policy 
in the region, leading to holding gaza under 
siege and strengthening israel’s national 
security.(31)  
      Huweidy’s views encapsulated the 
Brotherhood’s position against the liberal but 
corrupt Mubarak regime in order to distinguish 
its agenda from that of other nationalist forces 
in the field.  Many of these groups were in 
agreement with the Brotherhood’s critique 
of Mubarak’s foreign policy but few could 
match its uninterrupted campaign against 
the peace treaty.  The question remains how 
did Egypt get mired in the politics of gaza 
despite withdrawing from Sinai under Sadat 
who committed to a total abstention from 
involvement in the affairs of the Arab world? 
The answer is that Sadat did not control israeli 
policies, nor the response of palestinians to 
Israel’s iron fist strategy.  Once hostilities 
broke out in gaza and the West Bank during 
the first intifada of 1987, Egypt’s return to 
the palestinian arena became inevitable. 
in no time, israel’s harsh repression of the 
palestinians, particularly in the gaza Strip, 
delegitimized Egypt and the peace treaty. 
During the second intifada in 2000, gaza’s 
deteriorating security situation resulted in 
pressure on the Egyptian-israeli border as 
the besieged palestinians sought to smuggle 
food, medical supplies and weapons into their 
territory.  This led israel to build a barrier along 
its gaza border in 2000, and the Egyptians 
completed that barrier in 2005 as israel was 
about to finalize its removal of its settlers from 
the Strip.(32)
       gazans found a way of traversing the 
checkpoints and obstacles situated in the 
philadelphi corridor between Egypt and gaza, 
which were built on rafah’s no-man’s land. 
As early as 1987, tunnels were dug below 
Egypt’s entanglement in the affairs of 
Gaza reached a crescendo following 
Prime Minister’s Ariel Sharon’s decision 
to withdraw from the entire Strip in 2005 
when it consented to become a party to 
the Philadelphi Agreement.  
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this area, functioning like an ‘underground 
railroad’ through which not only people, 
goods, medicine, and food illegally travelled 
both ways, but also served as storage places 
for contraband weapons and other supplies. 
A thriving economy developed around the 
tunnels, which included gazans working in 
the digging and running of goods overseen 
by smugglers and merchants.  Most of these 
goods, with the exception of weapons, were 
imported from israel before it tightened the 
siege.  This forced the palestinians to breach 
the check-points through the subterranean 
tunnels in order to obtain merchandise from 
Egypt.(33) After israel complained of Egypt’s 
inability or disinterest in controlling this illegal 
lifeline to gaza, the latter built a tracking 
system to locate and destroy the tunnels 
with the help of United States Army Corps 
of Engineers.  The system culminated in the 
construction of a steel barrier running deep 
underground to destroy the tunnels.(34)
      Egypt’s entanglement in the affairs 
of gaza reached a crescendo following 
prime Minister’s Ariel Sharon’s decision to 
withdraw from the entire Strip in 2005 when it 
consented to become a party to the philadelphi 
Agreement.  This accord with israel which 
was facilitated by United States Secretary 
of State Condoleezza rice, committed both 
countries to regulate the flow of people and 
goods across the rafah check-point leading 
into Egypt. The rafah check-point was one 
of five controlling access to Egypt since the 
israelis permitted the pLo to establish a 
foothold in gaza following the signing of the 
oslo Accords in 1993.  it is the only crossing 
point between gaza and Egypt which was 
regulated by the Agreement of Access and 
Movement (AMA) of november 2005.  This 
arrangement allowed representatives of 
the European Union (EU) to be nominally 
disengaging from Gaza and the 
deployment of 8,000 settlers to the 
Maaleh Adumim settlement near 
Jerusalem was intended to solve Israel’s 
security dilemma and at the same time 
putting an end to any possibility of an 
independent Palestinian state in the rest 
of the West Bank. 
Information released by WikiLeaks from 
the cables of the United States Cairo 
embassy in 2010, revealed Mubarak’s 
disdain for Gazans who were supposedly 
under his protection.  
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in control, allowing the pnA, or the pLo’s 
government, the right to act as observer. 
real control, however, was exercised by the 
israelis through the use of video-cameras 
and computers connecting the area to israel’s 
systems.  The philadelphi Agreement, on the 
other hand, was signed in August of that year 
to ensure israel’s safety and security once it 
withdrew from gaza.  The agreement was a 
protocol which became a military annex to the 
Camp David Treaty, entrusting the Egyptian 
frontier army with the protection israel’s 
gaza border.  Egyptian border guards were 
charged with stopping ‘terrorist’ activities, the 
smuggling of weapons and munitions, and 
particularly the uncovering of the tunnels. The 
philadelphi annex angered the Egyptian public 
due to its meticulous and detailed definition of 
the duties of Egyptian guards, limiting them to 
the deployment of four units along the length 
of the Egyptian-gaza border. The number 
of military equipment for Egyptian use was 
restricted to four observation ships to protect 
the waters, unarmed helicopters to monitor 
the skies, and three land and sea observation 
radars.  The Egyptians were forbidden from 
building fortifications in Sinai and were subject 
to oversight by the multi-national force. The 
Egyptians, finally, were expected to exchange 
information and coordinate activities with the 
israeli military.(35) 
     Thus, disengaging from gaza and the 
deployment of 8,000 settlers to the Maaleh 
Adumim settlement near Jerusalem was 
intended to solve israel’s security dilemma 
and at the same time putting an end to any 
possibility of an independent palestinian state 
in the rest of the West Bank. This unilateral 
move was not intended to relieve Egypt’s 
gazan dilemma. Sharon’s act also shifted 
the responsibility for maintaining security 
along its gaza and Sinai borders to Egypt. 
When the Egyptian uprising broke out 
in 2011, the Brotherhood had already 
severed its ties to the ruling institution 
over a host of issues, but largely over 
Egyptian antagonism towards the struggle 
of the people of Gaza.  
Egypt’s military presence in Sinai, 
historically considered to be part of its 
territory since 1906, dwindled following 
the signing of the Camp David Treaty to 
22,000 troops and 230 tanks which were 
restricted to the western part of the 
peninsula.  
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(36) it was not only the Egyptian public which 
was infuriated by this development, it was 
also the israeli Knesset.  What rankled this 
assembly about the philadelphi Agreement 
was its government’s willingness to partner 
with Egypt by permitting the introduction of 
Egyptian fighting men and increased arms 
in the demilitarized Sinai area.  Even though 
the Egyptians pledged themselves against 
arming the palestinians of gaza, Knesset 
members such as Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chair and former minister yuval 
Shteinitz, opposed the agreement.  Calling it a 
dissipation of the main achievement of Camp 
David, namely pushing the Egyptian military 
away from israel’s borders, he demanded that 
the Knesset reject the military annex promptly. 
He added that, “Begin (former prime minister) 
is turning in his grave,”(37)
      But even after the ejection of the pnA 
from gaza following the victory of Hamas 
in the palestinian legislative elections of 
2006 and the violent clashes of 2007, israel 
remained the mighty power which kept 
gaza under siege.  israel continued to have 
exclusive control over gaza’s waters and 
airspace.  Also, by cutting the gaza Strip off 
from the West Bank, it doomed the former to 
a state of perpetual siege.  According to Saeb 
Erekat, the PNA’s official most familiar with 
israeli negotiations, gaza, in effect, remained 
occupied by israeli military power despite 
Sharon’s disengagement from the Strip:
An occupying power can exercise effective 
control without being physically present in all 
parts of the territory it occupies.  It suffices that 
it can project military power over the whole of 
the occupied territory by keeping forces in only 
parts of the territory.(38)
mubarak’s loss of leverage
Both the AMA Agreement and the 
philadelphi protocol signaled the decline 
of Egyptian influence in the Sinai region by 
confining it to an Israeli-led policy.  This pitted 
the beleaguered population of gaza against 
the combined forces of israel and Egypt, to 
the dismay of the majority of Egyptians.  
      information released by WikiLeaks 
from the cables of the United States Cairo 
Part of Egypt’s security dilemma in this 
region was the lack of a centralized tribal 
authority, leading each of the three main 
tribal units to operate single economic 
monopolies on their own.  
KUFA REVIEW: Academic Journal
68 KUFA REVIEW: No.2 - Issue 3 - Fall 2013
embassy in 2010, revealed Mubarak’s disdain 
for gazans who were supposedly under 
his protection.  The diplomats asserted that 
Mubarak was totally antagonistic to Hamas, 
which he viewed as a source of danger to his 
own country and that he routinely cooperated 
with israel, particularly in the area of 
intelligence.  These policies cemented Egypt’s 
relationship with the United States, israel’s 
patron state, without necessarily endearing 
Mubarak to his own people.  The releases 
indicated that for the mass of Egyptians, 
settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and not 
submitting to israel’s strategic agenda was a 
primary objective. This was proven following 
Israel’s attacks on the Turkish flotilla in May 
2010 which sought to break israel’s gaza 
blockade when Egypt maintained its silence 
while Turkey launched a diplomatic campaign 
against israel.  The islamist opposition in 
particular heralded recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 
defiance of Israel, adding one more critique 
to its list of grievances against Mubarak. 
WikiLeaks dropped another bombshell which 
enhanced the public’s perception of Egypt’s 
loss of all leverage over its erstwhile allies, the 
United States and israel.  Apparently, Egypt 
had asked the United States in october 2009 
to delay by six years the planned referendum 
on the independence of the Southern Sudan. 
Egypt pleaded that such a development would 
create a weak state, create an opportunity for 
meddling by Egypt’s enemies such as israel, 
and would most likely jeopardize Egypt’s 
access to the waters of the nile.(39)
     These revelations provided additional 
ammunition for the Brotherhood’s arsenal which 
was engaged at the time in a constitutional 
battle against Mubarak’s ruling group, the 
national Democratic party.  Having occupied 
20 per cent (or 88 seats) of the Egyptian lower 
house of the people’s Assembly by running 
as independents in the 2005 elections, 
the Brotherhood decided to withdraw from 
the 2010 parliamentary elections, citing 
widespread corruption and election rigging.
(40) When the Egyptian uprising broke out in 
2011, the Brotherhood had already severed 
its ties to the ruling institution over a host of 
issues, but largely over Egyptian antagonism 
towards the struggle of the people of gaza. 
After the fall of the Mubarak regime, the 
tribesmen succeeded in burning the trans-
Sinai gas pipeline leading to the disruption 
of this trade for 45 days. The main reason 
was that their demands for transit fees 
were ignored.  
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The israelis watched nervously as their 
allies in the Mubarak regime lost all power, 
maintaining hope that Egypt can still be led 
by general omar Suleiman, the intelligence 
chief with whom they maintained a working 
relationship over gaza.  When that hope faded, 
israel expressed its gratitude to the defeated 
president by offering him political asylum.(41) 
But while he ruled Egypt, Mubarak regularly 
sought to placate public opinion by tolerating 
a massive outpouring of sentiment in support 
of the second intifada of 2000.  This gave rise 
to two mass mobilizing movements which 
went on years later to hammer at his regime, 
namely the April 6 Movement and Kifayeh. 
Egypt’s Minister of Culture Farouq Husni, who 
was a protégé of Suzanne Mubarak, routinely 
pushed artists and intellectuals to refrain from 
any contact with their israeli counterparts.  This 
officially-sanctioned cultural boycott of Israel 
in solidarity with the palestinians extended 
even to the faculty of the American University 
of Cairo.(42)
sinai: egypt’s achilles Heel
one of the overlooked reasons for Egypt’s 
inability to extricate itself from the dangerous 
gaza-Egypt-israel border was its historic ties 
to the Sinai peninsula.  Estimated to have a 
population of 49,769 according to the census 
of 1960, the governorate of Sinai consisted 
of South and north Sinai.  All Sinai fell under 
israeli occupation as a result of the 1967 
June War: South Sinai, the smaller of the 
two with a population of only 4,355 people, 
was the more valuable of the two. Egyptians 
began to move to this area in the early 1980s, 
providing the necessary personnel to work in 
Egypt’s government-owned oil industry and 
newly-developed tourist sites.  By 1986, the 
population of the governorate of South Sinai 
grew to be 28,576 Egyptians and Bedouins, 
40 per cent of whom lived in eight recently-
developed urban centers.  The largest of these 
were El-Tur and Abu rudeis, the center of the 
oil industry.  Administrative divisions of the 
Southern Sinai governorate included the qism 
Gaza’s economic and ideological links to 
Cairo changed dramatically in October 
2012, when the former Sheikh of Qatar, 
Hammad ibn Khalifa al-Thani, extended 
the sum of $ 400 million in economic aid 
to the Hamas government.  This signaled 
Qatar’s seriousness in playing a major 
regional role after the popular uprisings of 
2011-2012 in the Arab world. 
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(division) of St. Catherine, where the famed 
Coptic monastery  (aka Santa Katarina) was 
a magnate for tourism, as well as the aqsam 
of rising red Sea resorts such as Sharm al-
Sheikh, nuweiba, and Dahab at the southern 
end of the gulf of Aqaba.(43)
    Egypt’s military presence in Sinai, 
historically considered to be part of its territory 
since 1906, dwindled following the signing of 
the Camp David Treaty to 22,000 troops and 
230 tanks which were restricted to the western 
part of the peninsula.  The demilitarization of 
Sinai and entrusting its defenses to a symbolic 
multi-national Un force (MF0), left the northern 
area and the main resorts of the southern 
region without any strong defenses.  The 
MFo, which was stationed there to monitor 
the Egyptian-israeli border and send early 
warnings of unauthorized troop movement, 
limited the deployment of Egyptian fighters, 
requiring significant inspection of any unlawful 
material.  This left the area east of al-Arish 
defenseless and vulnerable to Bedouin attacks. 
But in the last 20 years, Egypt managed to 
introduce mass Egyptian settlement in South 
Sinai which attracted a tourist inflow of 2.5 
million annually by developing economic and 
agri-business projects.(44)           
     Throughout this period of Egyptian-
israeli tension and struggle over control of 
Egypt’s historic trade routes to the Arab world, 
Sinai’s indigenous Bedouin population sought 
to gain ownership of the region’s limited 
natural resources largely by manipulating 
the antagonisms of the area’s powers. in 
recent years, the Bedouins developed many 
economic grievances, beginning with what 
they perceived to be an infringement on 
their traditional and customary rights as 
result of the Egyptian gas pipeline which 
was extended to israel under the Mubarak 
administration.  The Care Service Company 
which recruited workers for the MFo and the 
pipeline had avoided hiring Bedouins since 
it regarded them as a security risk.  neither 
did the Egyptian military and security services 
in the area draft them, thereby eliminating 
their eligibility for economic benefits which 
accrue from the draft.  Bedouin lands have 
also been seized by the Egyptian military, 
such as the small fishing village which was 
converted into the Sharm al-Sheikh resort. 
only nile Valley Egyptians were favored for 
Sinai’s new employment opportunities, while 
development contributed to the degradation 
of the area’s subsistence agriculture.  At 
the same time, hostility towards Egyptians 
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encouraged the Bedouins to seek revenue 
through illegal activities such as smuggling, 
running unlicensed tourist services around the 
Taba resort, gun-running to israel and gaza, 
and the cultivation of opium.  As a result, the 
Egyptians operated 13 jails in the northern 
Sinai.  part of Egypt’s security dilemma in 
this region was the lack of a centralized tribal 
authority, leading each of the three main tribal 
units to operate single economic monopolies 
on their own.  Thus, the Sawarka, rumaylat, 
and Tarabeen dominated gaza’s illegal tunnel 
trade, while the same Tarabeen monopolized 
trafficking in marijuana.   The Israeli port of 
Eilat was also not immune to the smuggling of 
illegal drugs, cigarettes, and migrant workers 
from East Africa, a trade dominated by the 
Azazmeh and Ahaiwat tribes.  often, these 
collaborated with gazans who were frustrated 
by the Egyptian-israeli economic blockade, 
leading to attacks on the tourist trade.(45)
     After the fall of the Mubarak regime, the 
tribesmen succeeded in burning the trans-Sinai 
gas pipeline leading to the disruption of this 
trade for 45 days. The main reason was that 
their demands for transit fees were ignored. 
neither did the pipeline of the Egyptian national 
gas Company (gASCo) which delivers gas 
to israel and Jordan through northern Sinai 
escape their attacks.  The Taba crossing 
check-point into Sinai, which operated since 
its founding in 1989 when Taba was restored 
to Egyptian sovereignty, was forced to close in 
2011.  A more serious attack occurred on an 
Egyptian military base on 5 August 2012 after 
Mohammed Morsi came to power.  israel’s 
response to these threats resulted in permitting 
Egypt to deploy two battalions in northern 
Sinai as a follow-up to the Camp David Treaty, 
the philadelphi protocols of 2005.  Additional 
Egyptian battalions were permitted to take 
over guard duties of the gas pipeline.(46) Thus, 
the Egyptian public became deeply aware of 
israel’s hegemonic role in Sinai and Egyptian 
dependence on the consent and approval 
of israeli military authorities even during the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s rule from June 2012 
until June 2013.  
     The Muslim Brotherhood, however, did 
The election of any democratic 
government in the future would increase 
popular pressure on the military to 
respond to any attack on Gaza, which, 
Americans fear, would further threaten 
the treaty. 
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not prove much different than the Mubarak 
regime when it came to safeguarding Egypt’s 
interests in Sinai.  As soon as he assumed 
office as Egypt’s president, Morsi closed the 
rafah crossing, gaza’s lifeline to Egypt, after 
unidentified militants killed 16 members of 
the Egyptian police-force stationed near the 
area.  The Hamas government denied that its 
territory was the home base of the attackers. 
Morsi used this opportunity to blame the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 
for its negligence of Sinai’s security, leading 
to the forced resignation of Field Marshall 
Mohammed Hussein al-Tantawi and Chief of 
Staff Samy Annan.  The former chief of military 
intelligence, general Abd al-Fatah al-Sissi, 
was sworn in as the new head of the council. 
(47) it was the same al-Sissi who unseated 
Morsi in a pseudo-coup in July 2013.
     gaza’s economic and ideological links 
to Cairo changed dramatically in october 
2012, when the former Sheikh of Qatar, 
Hammad ibn Khalifa al-Thani, extended the 
sum of $ 400 million in economic aid to the 
Hamas government.  This signaled Qatar’s 
seriousness in playing a major regional role 
after the popular uprisings of 20112012- in 
the Arab world.(48) But it also marked the first 
time when another Arab state beside Egypt 
succeeded in establishing itself as an arbiter 
of gaza’s security disputes.  in the meantime, 
the Morsi government backed off from the 
Brotherhood’s historic antagonism to israel 
by seeming to ignore the latter’s economic 
strangulation of gaza and quietly resume gas 
shipment to the Jewish state.  Hostility to the 
Camp David Treaty also faded as the new 
government of Egypt began quietly to abide 
by its terms.  Morsi has already expressed to 
the United States his willingness to abide by 
the terms of the treaty and maintain peaceful 
relations with israel. Morsi has even mediated 
a cease-fire agreement between Hamas 
and israel in november 2012, suggesting 
that his party was interested in pursuing a 
pragmatic approach towards israel.(49) yet, 
gaza remained the main geographic gateway 
when its Freedom and Justice Party 
came to power in 2012, the Brotherhood 
assumed control on the back of a popular 
uprising but ended up replicating the 
policies of the corrupt and liberal 
Mubarak regime in his fated attempt to 
manage the problem of Gaza and the 
Palestinians.  
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to israel, posing the possibility, based on its 
geopolitical significance to Egypt, as a staging 
ground for any future attacks on israel if the 
Egyptians experience a threat to their northern 
and eastern boundaries.  The United States, 
on its part, continued to be concerned for the 
possibility of rupturing the treaty if Egypt’s 
revolutionary tremors persisted.  The United 
States also realizes that the threat to the 
treaty may result from israel’s possible over-
reaction to attacks emanating from gaza or 
Sinai, as when israel pursued attackers into 
Sinai in August 2011, ending in the killing 
of five Egyptian soldiers.  This produced 
demonstrations against the israeli embassy 
in Cairo and calls for abrogating the treaty at 
a time when SCAF was still in control of the 
Egyptian government.  The election of any 
democratic government in the future would 
increase popular pressure on the military 
to respond to any attack on gaza, which, 
Americans fear, would further threaten the 
treaty. researchers in the Brookings institute, 
a mainstream think-tank based in Washington, 
have already developed a theory in anticipation 
of such events.  By focusing on Egypt’s 
mounting fiscal and economic problems and 
the inevitable need to impose painful austerity 
measures on a suffering population, they 
speculated that these circumstances may 
tempt the government to pursue populist 
measures, such as increased confrontations 
with Israel, thereby deflecting attention from its 
own failings.  israel has already responded to 
this eventuality by building a border fence and 
creating a new brigade to defend its southern 
region and the port of Eilat.(50)
Conclusion: The Permanent Reality of 
Geopolitics
Even though Egypt’s interest in the 
palestine issue had always extended to 
events in the West Bank, the Egyptian 
military’s concern always focused mainly 
on Sinai and gaza.  This obsession with 
safeguarding the country’s routes to the rest 
of the Arab world due east was finally given 
an ideological twist by nasser in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  After Egypt led a separate route 
to political independence than the rest of the 
Arab east beginning with the revolution of 
1919, its Liberal governments were unable 
to hue to this course after the rise of Zionist 
israel.  But having fought and lost several 
major wars against the militarized state on 
its borderlands under nasser, Egypt tried to 
pursue an isolationist, Egypt-first policy, under 
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Sadat and his Camp David Treaty.  Turmoil 
along these borders persisted despite United 
States’ sponsorship of the treaty simply 
because, unlike what Sadat had predicted, 
israel continued to enjoy the status of the 
number one United States ally in the region. 
regime after regime was straddled with the 
problem of israel’s own unstable southern 
boundary which attracted the support of anti-
government forces to the plight of the people 
of gaza.  The Muslim Brotherhood led the 
popular struggle against liberalism in Egypt, 
but also made the fate of gaza’s people the 
centerpiece of its anti-government critique. 
But when its Freedom and Justice party came 
to power in 2012, the Brotherhood assumed 
control on the back of a popular uprising but 
ended up replicating the policies of the corrupt 
and liberal Mubarak regime in his fated 
attempt to manage the problem of gaza and 
the palestinians.  The Morsi state surrendered 
the initiative to Qatar as the latter began to 
manipulate Egypt’s rudderless Arab ship 
of state to advantage.  now, another liberal 
regime has assumed power, strengthened by 
a popular mandate and charged again with the 
responsibility of seeking equilibrium between 
geopolitical realities in Sinai and ideological 
pressures at home. 
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